Abstract-It is well know that jamming i cost attack method against GNSS-based appli years these types of attacks have increased s the availability of GPS jammers that can be example, on the internet and due to the consta GNSS-based applications . Usually a jamming in-car jammer, is a quite simple electronic de single frequency tone or some type of chirp sig signal can be considered as an instantaneous can be mitigated with very simple processin Time Fourier Transform. These considera development of an equipment able to reduce harmful signals over a generic GNSS receiver t Defined Radio (SDR) equipment. In thi introduction to the problem is presented and mitigation technique is shown along with some in-car jammers.
INTRODUCTION
In 2009 a satellite-based positioning aircraft landing at Newark airport suffered breaks. After two months of investigation Aviation Authority it was discovered that a tr the nearby highway every day had a ch onboard causing a serious integrity threat GNSS-based infrastructure.
In 2010 the Guardian wrote: "Criminal using GPS jammers imported from China t expensive cars and lorries carrying valuable l fears that terrorists could use more powerful air traffic…".
Obviously the use of jammers is illegal but these devices are gaining popularity to a increase in insurance costs, as well as any tra based monitoring. Most of low cost in-car hardware and produce simple aim of this work is to analyze mitigation techniques for thes idea is to put a software de antenna and a GNSS receive interferences.
In Figure 1 two possible im jamming mitigation are shown version that can be put into receiver chain. The seco implementation of a self-conta the GNSS receiver is a SW i itself. Unlike the single frequency jammers 0035C, as shown previously) the last jamme 242G, is a multi-frequency jammer. It has fo control switch which enables (or not) antenna. It transmits bidirectional chirp L1/L2/L3/L4/L5 bands with a multi saw-to fourth antenna is of particular interest bec three chirp signals in the L2, L4 and L5 band spectrogram of Figure 5 . The procedur spectrogram is the same as the previous case frequency is 10 GHz. The sweep time is the chirp signals (about 9 µsec). s a chirp signal on width; this is an 20 µsec versus of jammer J-0035C re 4.
35C
(J-0035B and Jer analyzed, the Jur antennas with a each transmitting p signals in the ooth function. The cause it transmits ds as shown in the re to obtain the e, but the sampling same for the three In Table II the measured pa reported. 
III. SDR HW
The proposed experimenta National Instruments USRP 29 in the L1 band for the C/A co has both RX and TX chann frequency range between 5 sampling frequency up to 100 implement both architectures p the TX channel). The only add antenna, a power supply for th an "in-cable amplifier". . This HW allows to proposed in Figure 1 (thanks to itional HW required is an active he antenna and (recommended) e L1A-GPS that has a low-noise [3] ; the selected amplifer is the B [4] ; the amplifier is equipped with an internal bias-tee that provides the power to the antenna. Within the USPR the signal can be downconverted to an intermediate frequency and sampled. The sampled signal is transferred to the host computer that can be programmed with the desidered algorithms, then the signal can be:
-upconverted to the L1 frequency and transmitted with the USRP TX or -sent directly to the GNSS receiver algorithms (for example the algorithms proposed by Borre in [5] ) to perform the signals acquisition, tracking and PVT estimation.
Knowing the Maximum Input Power (MIP) for USRP-2920, that is 0 dBm [2] , and the power trasmitted from the various jammers (Table 1) it is possible to calculate the minimum distance that produces an USRP saturation (D SAT ). When the USRP is in saturation it is impossible to implement any mitigation tecnique due to the distortion of the incoming signals. This is the bottom limit under which the jammer cannot be mitigated.
It is also important to define and find the maximum distance (D MAX ) at which the jammer still produces a harmful interference on the receiver. In this paper D MAX is the distance at wich the jammer produces 5 over 100 missed acquisition. An acquisition is missed if the peak-to-sidelobe ratio (PSLR) of the correlation function at the receiver is less than 2.5.
In Table III The aim of the mitigation algorithms to be implemented in the mitigation block is to reduce D MAX as much as possible, up to the limit D MAX =D SAT .
IV. MITIGATION TECHNIQUES AND RESULTS
Mitigation of narrow band interfering signals can be, in principle, easily done using Short Time Fourier Transform (STFT), by blanking the portion of spectrum in which the interference is located. In particular when the presence of an interfering signal is detected on a part of the signal in the time domain, a blanking of the intefering signal in the STFT domain is applied and then the IFFT is applied to come back to time domain. The performance of this simple approach depends on different parameters such as the frequency resolution of the method used, the time resolution (i.e. sampling time) of the incoming signal, the STFT window length and the blanking logic. In literature some works based on the concept of time-frequency analysis exist: in [6] a mitigation algorithm based on STFT and FrFT (Fractional Fourier Transform) is shown and in [7] this algorithm is examined in depth.
In this work the USRP-2920 is exploited at a sampling frequency of 100 MHz, and a down-conversion to an intermediate frequency of 10 MHz.
The mitigation block performs two preliminary operations:
• Band Pass Filtering with 2 MHz bandwidth
• Undersampling to 25 MSample/sec.
After these operations the Detection Process works and, if neeeded, the Mitigation Process is applied on the acquired signal.
A simulated GPS signal has been produced with a received power level of -158.5 dBm [7] , and a noise power level derived by a Band Pass Filter filter of 2 MHz.
The detection technique is based on the detection of a signal with power that exceeds a threshold in the time domain. In particular the Marcum theory is adopted and the detection threshold is determined by fixing the probability of false alarm (to 10 -6 ) and the probability of missed detection to 0.9. In this case the detection of an interference on a GPS signal needs a Jammer-to-Noise-Ratio (JNR) greather than 13.2 dB.. The described detection procedure is implemented on the simulated signal samples; in particular, a sliding window is used to select 32 samples and on these samples the incoming signal power is estimated: if the power is greater than the detection threshold then the presence of a jamming signal is declared.
If no jamming signal is detected then the sliding window is shifted of one sample, and the procedure is repeated.
A window length of 32 samples has been chosen due to the sampling frequency adopted in the algorithm. With a 25 MHz sampling frequency the time window length is 1.28 µs: the sweep time for class II-III jammers is of the order of tens of µsec and it is mandatory to have more than one window on a sweep time, to distinguish the frequency sweep of the jammer.
When a jamming signal is detected, the mitigation process is executed and so a STFT is performed. Initially, a portion of the signal is selected by multiplying the incoming signal with an Hanning window, then the FFT is done and, , the sample with the maximum amplitude is found. The blanking process consists zeroing both the frequency bins where the maximum amplitude has been found and its adjacent frequency bins. So, exploiting an IFFT it is possible to come back to time domain and finally interleaving the examined samples with the samples produced in the previous step; at this point the sliding window is shifted of one sample and the procedure is repeated.
This implementation corresponds with a Sh Transform exploiting Hanning windows factor of 1 sample, between windows of 32 s 6, a block diagram of the developed algorithm In Figure 7 an example is shown of the GPS jammed signal; in this case the jamm by the jammer number 3 of Table I : this jam unidirectional chirp signal with one saw-to has a sweep time of 11.71 µsec, with a ban MHz. The signal is centered on IF (10 MHz is between 9 MHz and 11 MHz, due to filte of the filter is a hint of mitigation, because jammer is out of band, it does not disturb signal. In this figure, the GPS signal is not power level is much lower than the powe signal. In Figure 8 the spectrogra mitigation technique is shown: has been detected and mitigate MHz and 11 MHz is visible. Side Lobe Ratio (PSLR) of the (without and with mitigation). evaluate the performance of the in a good satellite acquisition a as been chosen. This figure is ulations of the detection and in Figure 9 it is worth nothing applied has limited the jammer erage area from about 300 m to n the figure represents D SAT (4.1 PSLR of the correlation function for an hreshold of 2.5 Table IV shows a summary of the performance improvement for various types of jammer, using this mitigation method, is shown .
The maximum distances within which the jammer disrupts the acquisition process are significantly reduced and the improvements are shown in terms of distance percentage change. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
A possible detection and mitigation strategy for in-car jamming has been presented. The technique is based on time-frequency analysis through the STFT transformation; the developed algorithm has been applied to signal produced by in-car jammers (transmitting both CW and chirp-signal depending on the specific jammer class).
For jammer number 1 and jammer number 2 (Table IV) , that are CW jammers, the problem of missed acquisition vanish after mitigation because the maximum distance for acquisition disrupt (Dmax) becomes smaller than the maximum distance for the receiver saturation (Dsat).
For class II jammers (jammer number 3 and jammer number 4 (Table IV) ) and for class III jammer (jammer number 5 (Table IV) ), the maximum distance is significantly decreased.
